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Abstract: This paper examines the value of human rights arguments in reducing the 
access gap to patented medicines. Great efforts continue to be poured into 
institutional, doctrinal and activist settings to bring human rights thinking to bear on 
the grant and exploitation of patents. Far from triggering meaningful intervention, 
however, the international human right to health functions as a placeholder, pointing 
to specific sites of injury or harm and diverting attention from larger ambitions of 
justice over current incentive structures around patented pharmaceuticals. Excessively 
technical, incomplete theorising and linguistically driven decision-making have purged 
reflexive spaces in patent law that might have accommodated purposive reasoning 
aligned with the protection of human rights. Reliance on the human right to health to 
correct the technocratic forces in patent law is doomed to fail, because doing so 
ignores the source of the problem. The point is not that we should not limit patent 
rights; it is that we cannot do so using only human rights thinking. It would be far 
better to uncouple human rights from patent law, so that we may systematically retool 
the latter to be a purposive and reflexive system of law that understands and 
participates in its own consequences.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2015 5.9 million children under the age of five died, almost all in developing 
countries from easily preventable or treatable causes1 – but when and how does 
this become a human rights crisis? Tagging human rights to the exploitation of 
patent monopolies on medicines can be traced to the catastrophic event that was 
AIDS in Africa at the turn of the century. Millions of Africans lost their lives,2 
while some developed-country governments and pharmaceutical companies 
blocked access to low-cost antiretroviral drugs. That fiasco mobilised civil society3 
and enough international political will to translate into legal arrangements4 to 
ensure that patent monopolies do not get in the way of saving lives, at least when 
such large numbers are at stake.5 While the juxtaposition might seem natural in 
light of these developments, how much have we actually achieved decades later by 
associating human rights with the problem of access to medicines protected by 
patent monopolies?  
 Over the last two decades since the AIDS crisis, it has seemed as though drug 
companies are able to charge as much as they want for medicines that are 
patented. Humira, the anti-inflammatory drug which is also the best-selling 
prescription drug in the world, rose 100% in price from 2012 and currently costs 
38,000 USD per patient per year.6 The soaring cost of Mylan’s life-saving 
Epinephrine pens is well documented – this old technology now costs over 600 
USD, a price increase of 500% since 2007.7 As bad as these examples are, what 
makes them worse for the people who owe their lives to highly priced drugs or 
devices is that in many cases, if the patent was taken out of the picture, low-cost 
generic options are available or could be made available for a fraction of the cost. 
                                                      
1 ‘Levels and Trends in Child Mortality’, Report by UN Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality 
Estimation (2015) 
http://www.childmortality.org/files_v20/download/IGME%20Report%202015_9_3%20LR%20Web.p
df. See also Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Saving the Lives of 6 Million Children a year Wouldn’t Cost much’ Market 
Watch Opinion (May 31 2006). Available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/saving-the-lives-of-6-
million-children-a-year-wouldnt-cost-much-2016-05-31. 
2 In 2005 two million Africans died of AIDS, but this year WEF reported that AIDS is no longer the 
leading cause of death in Africa. See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/08/hiv-aids-is-no-longer-
the-leading-cause-of-death-in-africa 
3 Portrayed in Fire in the Blood: Monopoly, Malice and Medicines, Directed by Dylan Mohan (2012). 
4 Principally, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Available at 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm>. accompanied by a 
more intangible recognition of ‘Doha principles’.  
5 Despite being hailed as a watershed in international trade, the Doha Declaration has not solved the 
problem of access to medicines. VB Kerry and K Lee, ‘TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 
Decision: What are the Remaining Steps to Protect Access to Medicines?’ 2007 Global Health 3:3. 
6 D Hakim, ‘Humira’s Best Selling Drug Formula: Start at a High Price, Go Higher’ 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/business/humira-drug-prices.html>. 
7 C Duhigg, ‘Outcry Over Epipen Prices Hasn’t Made them Lower’ 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/business/angry-about-epipen-prices-executive-dont-care-
much.html?_r=0. 
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 The story is even more telling with the realisation that variable pricing 
decisions, even for life-saving drugs are based on market expectations, rather than 
cost of production. For example, direct acting anti-viral drugs that are crucial in 
the treatment of Hep C range in prices globally: Sofosbuvir from $300 (India, 
Pakistan) to $20 590 (Switzerland); for daclatasvir from $175 (Egypt) to $14 899 
(Germany); for simeprevir from $241 (Egypt) to $14 865 (Australia); for 
ledipasvir-sofosbuvir from $400 (Egypt and Mongolia) to $24 890 (Germany); and 
for ombitasvir-paritaprevir-ritonavir (or 2D regimen) from $400 (Egypt) to 
$20 215 (Switzerland).8  
 These disparities alone do not make drugs affordable in the countries where 
they are priced lower. A study on 23 cancer drugs for instance showed that once 
monthly drug prices were expressed as a percentage of domestic product per 
capita at purchasing power parity, cancer drugs were found less affordable in low-
income countries.9 In India only 15% of the population has an annual income 
which is more than the baseline cost of treatment of a cancer and by 2020 there 
will be an estimated two million new cancer cases a year.10 
 The lack of access to patented medicines and the question of affordability 
remains a catastrophic question for many Third World countries, but it is by no 
means limited to them and extends to the relatively poor in the first world. Even 
as drug price increases are received by the public with a mixture of incredulity and 
moral outrage, what, if any, are the current strategies available to global civil 
society and legal advocacy groups? 
 There is an established propensity in academic commentary,11 international 
negotiations,12 advocacy literature13 and intervention14 to argue that the scope and 
                                                      
8 Andrieux-Meyer et al., ‘Disparity in Market Prices for Hepatitis C Direct Acting Drugs’ 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(15)00156-4/fulltext. 
9 Goldstein et al., ‘A Global Comparison of the Cost of Patented Cancer Drugs in Relation to Global 
Differences in Wealth’ 2017 Oncotarget 8(42) 71548-71555. 
10 Deena Beasley, ‘Cancer Drug Prices Highest in US, Least Affordable in India, China: Study’ available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-cancer-prices-idUSKCN0YS172. 
11 ER Gold, ‘Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis’ (2013) The Journal of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics 41(1):185-98, identifying three broad approaches to the relationship between human rights and 
patents – the subjugation, integrated and co-existence. 
12 For instance, the appropriate linkages between consent arrangements and the patent system. See Anja 
von der Ropp and Tony Taubmann, ‘Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of Moore and the Hagahai 
People’ (2005) WIPO Magazine Issue 5. See also M Temmerman, ‘Human Rights in the Patent 
Procedure: The Issue of Prior Informed Consent of Human Donors to the Patenting of Inventions 
Based Upon their Genetic Material’, NCCR-Trade Working Paper 2006/01 Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2009/wipo_ls_biot_ge_09/pdf/2_pic-
workshop_report_12_07.pdf, labelling Art 26 of the EU Biotech Directive, which introduces an EU 
Prior Informed Consent requirement as being little more than symbolic at p. 8. 
13 See P Benkimoun, Morts sans ordonnance (Hachette 2002) on the struggle to improve access to patented 
drugs. The book details civil society movements (comprising, among others; NGOs, health professionals 
and grass root movements) that, both in industrialised and developing countries, have set up alliances and 
networks to defend the principle that human dignity and health should come before private interests and 
profits. 
14 See for instance the Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, which 
declares that the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention are both part of, and should be interpreted 
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remit of patent laws must and can be moderated by recourse to international 
human rights law, and human rights thinking.15 The argument, often raised in, but 
not limited to, the access to patented medicines,16 aims to moderate the terms on 
which patents are granted as well as limit post-grant exploitation. It extends to 
arguing that some kinds of patents on life-saving drugs must be negated due to 
their potential to impair human rights,17 and that the post-grant exploitation of 
patents could be or ought to be guided and tempered by human rights thinking 
where local affordability determines access. A different kind of argument is 
advanced when public health needs or national emergencies arise in the context of 
granting of compulsory licences for patented medicines.18 In all these kinds of 
arguments, the human rights claim is often resorted to as a generalisable back-up 
that outdoes any other legal claim, including the claim to a legitimately prosecuted 
or granted patent (property) right. In reality, however, there is cause to be sceptical 
of the impact of these arguments, if nothing else because of the persistence of the 
access gap and monopoly pricing. The resources poured into multiple 
international fora, activism and doctrinal tinkering are not commensurate with the 
insubstantial inroads made into patent law by international human rights law. 
 It is true both that human rights are important and that denial of access to 
patented substances in case of ill health, critical or otherwise, can lead to loss or 
blighting of life, and other impairment of human rights. Given the backdrop to 
the struggle to improve access to medicines, the UN Special Rapporteur in the 
field of cultural rights Farida Shaheed’s statement19 that ‘where patent rights and 
human rights are in conflict, human rights must prevail’, seems more than just 
unhelpful. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that there is a common 
system of law inhabited by both patent rights and human rights, such that a 
hierarchy can be imposed, or that one system of rights can resolve the problems 
created by another. In reality, human rights and patent law have widely differing 
institutional dispositions, inclinations and reach. The two systems are governed by 
                                                                                                                                         
in the light of, a wider set of international rules and principles, including regimes dealing with human 
rights and biological diversity. Available at <https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf>. 
15 Often human rights are raised as counterweights to the expansion of rights, as do those seeking such 
expansion. See L Helfer and G Autin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). An early version of the former is seen in Beyleveld and Brownsword, 
Mice, Morality and Patents: the Onco-mouse Application and Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention 
(London, 1993), arguing that patent law must be read as a charter for human rights. 
16 IPR, Innovation, Human Rights and Access to Drugs: An Annotated Bibliography WHO Essential 
Drugs and Medicines Policy Series no: 14. Available at 
<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4910e/s4910e.pdf>. 
17 First clearly laid out in influential 2002 Final Report of the UK Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, which states that fundamental human rights must not be subordinate to the requirements of 
intellectual property policy. Final Report 
<http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm>. 
18 See Also see EK Oke, ‘Patent Rights, Access to Medicines and the Justiciability of the Right to Health 
in Kenya, South African and India’ in A Diver and J Miller (eds), Justiciability of Human Rights Law in 
Domestic Jurisdictions (Springer, 2016. 
19 F Shaheed, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights ‘Patent Policy and the 
Right to Culture and Science’ A/70/279, 4 Aug 2015. 
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different domestic and international legal cultures, and there is no direct, 
formalistic overlap. The two systems of law are like oil and water; the argument 
that one should prevail over the other is intellectually incoherent. In fact, the 
juxtaposition of these separate legal orders by advocacy groups and legal scholars 
is doing more harm than good; and this paper presents the case that patent law 
should be dissociated from human rights. 
 My view is both a descriptive as well as a normative one, and uses 
pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines as a case in point. Over the last 
few decades patent law has had to respond to unprecedented and emerging 
technologies, presenting opportunities to re-examine the underlying justifications 
for the grant and maintenance of the patent system in its current form – 
opportunities that are not always taken. What we see instead is a heightening of 
technocratic decision-making as a response to uncertainty. As a result, reflexive 
spaces in the law have been purged or are shrinking. 
 Reflexivity requires more than a simple, instrumental problem-solving 
approach using rationality and technology. The reflexivity that is lacking in the 
patent system, to use Ulrich Beck’s term, requires self-confrontation where the 
system might engage with the unintended, negative and systemic consequences of 
instrumental problem-solving.20 In other words, reflexivity requires an awareness 
of the conditions of action, as well as the competence and agency to contemplate 
changing those conditions.21 In the patent system this would mean institutional 
processes that allow key actors in the system to step back from what they are 
doing to ask whether what they are doing procedurally is what they are supposed 
to be doing substantively. And if they do not know what they are supposed to be 
doing substantively beyond what they are doing procedurally, they need to reflect 
on how that might be changed. 
 Attempts to push for ‘human rights thinking’ in patent law without 
understanding the structural and technocratic disposition of patent law risk 
strengthening the placeholder effect of the human right to health – where instead 
of a systemic retooling of patent law, we focus on specific sites of injury and harm 
through a non-existent hierarchisation narrative. To make real strategic gains in 
public health and affordable medicines, we must understand and try to correct the 
many failings of patent law, including its epistemic weaknesses and instrumental 
reasoning. Relying on the human right to health indirectly undermines, and may 
even militate against, a radical correction of course of global patent law. 
 My argument differs from conventional thinking on the relationship between 
the two systems of law in at least three ways. First, the question whether 
                                                      
20 While it’s beyond the scope of this paper to fully unpack what modern reflexivity might mean for 
patent law, Beck’s analysis of the meaning of the term is useful and relevant. Ulrich Beck, World at Risk 
(Polity, 2008?).  
21 For a general discussion see G Soros, ‘The Human Uncertainty Principle’ Lecture One Available here 
<https://www.georgesoros.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/the_soros_lectures-
human_uncertainty_principle-2017_10_05.pdf>. 
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intellectual property rights are genuine human rights has been studied in depth by 
many scholars.22 These debates are important to the main thrust of my argument 
only in so far as treating intellectual property rights as human rights exemplifies 
the instrumental nature of the moralism behind international human rights law. 
Second, much of the scholarship around intellectual property rights and the 
human right to health refers to the apparent paradox that arises when two human 
rights collide.23 My argument draws out the incoherence in laying them out 
together by unpacking the false promise of an apparent hierarchisation, when 
neither the moralism nor legality behind each of these human rights can justify 
such arrangements.  
 Third, my argument is related to, but different from, that made under the 
transnationalisation framework. The debate on transnationalisation with respect to 
the human right to health and patent law exposes the diminution of choice 
available to domestic policy-makers24 and law-makers and argues that it is this 
constriction in rule-making powers that is at the heart of our inability to improve 
access to patented medicines. The transnationalisation debate does not, however, 
fully grapple with all the ways in which reflective spaces are lost in a technocratic 
patent system that values predictable, engineered outcomes over messy or 
ambiguous legal positions.  
 Patent legislations cannot cater for all scenarios due to the evolving, and non-
linear nature of technologies. General principles and old rules often have to be 
remade and recast in the image of the new, unprecedented technology by patent 
offices. This process dominated as it is by documentary evidence, examination 
guidelines, administrative procedures and technical expertise, results in textual and 
rhetorical artefacts (such as claim formats or claim types). These are designed to 
guide expectations and give certainty to future patent applicants by presenting 
even deeply contested questions as axiomatic guidelines. The resultant shrinking of 
reflexivity coupled with uncertain and infrequent pathways to judicial review, is an 
enduring characteristic of national and international patent law that has serious 
and multiple repercussions, including for the human rights narrative. 
 
 
PATENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO PATENTED 
MEDECINES 
 
Activism and advocacy that aim to improve access to medicines are often 
motivated by the many ways in which the human right to health is impacted by the 
                                                      
22 Art 27(2) of the UNDHR. 
23 LR Helfer, ‘Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property’ (2007) 40 UC Davis Law 
Review, 971–1020.  
24 LR Helfer, ‘Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the 
Transnational Legal Order and Access to Medicines’ in TC Halliday and G Shaffer (eds), Transnational 
Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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enforcement of patents including the entitlement to the patent itself as a human 
right25  The nature of the relationship between patents and high prices that inhibit 
access, and potentially impair human rights, however, is not self-evident. 
Monopoly-driven drug pricing is entrenched in the dominant property 
justifications26 for patents that exert no post-hoc control over how a patent is used 
or exploited. Legislative frameworks set up the examination and grant of patents 
but never address commercial or technical use of the monopoly explicitly. This is 
despite or perhaps because, of the fact that many of patent law’s presuppositions 
and assumptions remain untestable and many of the unproven benefits of the 
grant of property rights is taken as a given.27 The Access to Medicines (A2M) 
movement is acutely contested because our present model of economics supports 
the belief that technological innovation supported by patents drives growth, so 
tinkering with the foundational ideas about the incentive effect of patents begins 
to seem like an ideological attack on economic growth.28  
 Affordability is a complex problem, and both access to drugs and 
affordability is not simply a matter of price. Pharmaceutical companies that own 
patents clearly play a part in making medicines more affordable. When patent 
monopolies cover pharmaceutical compositions that are needed to treat particular 
conditions or save lives, the degree of exploitation including pricing becomes 
pivotal to access. National purchasing agreements, presence of national health 
services, market dynamics, and regulation of private insurers all have an important 
part to play in affordability metrics. Goldstein’s study calculates the monthly price 
of drugs as a percentage of gross domestic product, which is a better indicator of 
‘affordability’.29 The Access to Medicines Index is an initiative that ranks the 
world’s 20 largest pharmaceutical companies in terms of their efforts to improve 
access in 107 middle- to low-income countries. But the fact of the matter is that 
one-third of the world still does not have access to even essential medicines.30  
 While affordability might be particularly acute in the developing world,31 
erratic and hyper-inflationary pharmaceutical pricing is becoming increasingly 
common. Recently in the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority alleged that 
                                                      
25 Art 27(2) of the UNDHR. 
26 see Chris Dent, ‘The Purpose of Patents for Invention: Regulation of Exchange versus Incentive’ 
(2017) IPQ (3) 245–61. 
27 K Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy’ Institute for International Economics 
(2000).  
28 IP watch William New, US Working To Block UN High-Level Panel On Access To Medicines Ideas In 
Geneva And Capitals 22 Jan 2018. Available here <https://www.ip-watch.org/2018/01/22/us-working-
block-un-high-level-panel-access-medicines-ideas-geneva-capitals/>. 
29 Goldstein et al, supra n 9, Rabin Institute. The study found that in the US median monthly price of 
branded cancer drugs still protected by patents was USD 8700 compared to USD 2600 in the UK and 
USD 3200 in China. 
30 See MSF Access to Medicines campaign <https://www.msf.org.uk/issues/access-medicines>. 
31 Target 8e of the Millennium Development Goals acknowledges the need to improve the availability of 
affordable medicines for the world’s poor. 
http://www.who.int/medicines/mdg/MDG08ChapterEMedsEn.pdf. Also see the Global Access 
Problem campaign page ‘Health Gap’ http://www.healthgap.org/accesstomeds. 
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Actavis and Concordia had colluded to increase the price of hydrocortisone tablets 
supplied to the NHS by 80% in the period 2013–2016; a jaw-dropping price 
increase of 12,000% from 2008 when it was 70p a tablet.32 A 2015 study in the US 
reports that the prices of anti-cancer drugs have increased 10% every year between 
1995 and 2013.33 New immunotherapies have price tags of more than £100,000 
per patient per year.34 Pricing strategies increasingly threaten to overflow from 
pockets of inaccessibility in the developed world into a general systemic problem 
with obvious implications for human rights. It is not just loss of life that is of 
concern, but significant impairment to the quality of life due to inability to access 
treatment on financial grounds is a moral minefield. 
 Over the years, the rules that allow patents on different kinds of subject 
matter have seen incremental expansion resulting in the possibilities of multiple 
monopolies and other forms of control35 over a variety of forms of the same drug, 
accompanied by cumulative increases in durations of monopoly pricing. The 
regulations and possibility of further monopolies on incremental innovations were 
all developed at various times to solve localised problems within the legal incentive 
structure. Yet, despite the regulatory and governance measures shoring up patent 
law and systems associated with it, we are seeing ‘rising prices of new 
pharmaceuticals, rapidly changing markets for health technologies, and a lack of 
market incentives for older medicines’ place increasing pressure on health 
systems.36  
 Pharmaceutical companies often claim that the cost of drug development is 
so high that extending the duration of monopolies is essential to the competitive 
survival of the sector.37 This claim, which lies at the heart of justifications by the 
pharmaceutical sector for high drug prices, is difficult to debunk because there is 
                                                      
32 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-alleges-anti-competitive-agreements-for-hydrocortisone-
tablets. Such collusion is coming under increased scrutiny by competition law authorities. See also Final 
Report: Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (8 July 2009) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf. 
33 DH Howard, PB Bach, ER Berndt, RM Conti, ‘Pricing in the Market for Anti-Cancer Drugs’ NBER 
Working Paper 20867 (2015). 
34 As reported by Cancer Research UK <http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/funding-for-
researchers/research-features/2016-08-10-health-economics-the-cancer-drugs-cost-conundrum>. 
35 Such as data exclusivity, marketing approval and supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), which 
extend patent rights on pharmaceutical and plant products, ostensibly in the interests of public health and 
innovation. Council regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for medicinal products>. During a period of data exclusivity, pre-clinical and clinical 
trials data produced by the first applicant for approval of a new medicinal product may not be referenced 
in the data of another company (typically a generic company). Marketing authorisation is a period during 
which a generic company may not market an equivalent generic version of the originator’s pharmaceutical 
product. Charles Clift, ‘Data Protection and Data Exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals’ in 
Krattiger et al. (eds), Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best 
Practices (MIHR USA, 2007).  
36 Towards Access 2030 WHO Medicines and Health Products Program Strategic Framework 2016-20130 
WHO strategy, executive summary. http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/fr/m/abstract/Js23222en/. 
37 See ‘New Health Technologies: Managing Access, Value and Sustainability’, OECD Report (2017) 
calling into question the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing strategies. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/new-approach-needed-to-tackle-rising-drug-prices.htm. 
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very little transparency around associated research and development expenditure. 
There are studies that attack this justification by showing how a large proportion 
of drug discovery (84% in one study)38 is in fact paid for by public money; and 
many entities have tried to pin down the mechanism of pricing as the first step 
towards accountability.39  
 Recently an important study40 on ten cancer drugs in the US revised down the 
median research and development costs of these drugs to USD 0.6 billion 
(compared to USD 1.395 billion in the DiMasi study where sample drugs were 
kept secret)41, while total revenue from sales of these ten drugs was USD 67 
billion compared to a total research and development spend of USD 7.2 billion. 
The boldness of the study’s claims is already attracting intense scrutiny and 
controversy.42 In a bid to rewrite the narrative that drug development is 
exorbitant, other innovation platforms have tried to demonstrate alternative, open 
innovation models43 that rely on a mix of public and private action to maximise 
innovative possibilities while maintaining commercial prospects.  
 It has been accepted for a long time now that drug prices are not tied to 
specific ‘backward look on sunk research and development’ costs.44 However 
‘policies that support high prices and investment decisions are very much influenced 
by perceptions of R&D costs, and for that reason, estimates are surprisingly 
contested and political’– a vexing problem that long-time advocate and Access to 
Medicines campaigner James Love calls ‘a deliberate veil of ignorance’.45 Recently 
the UNSG’s High Level Panel on Access to Drugs has sought to push 
‘delinkage’46 between incentive to invest in research and prices of drugs globally as 
the single most important effort that can help narrow the access gap to medicines. 
                                                      
38 DW Light and JR Lexchin ‘Pharmaceutical Research and Development: What do We Get for All That 
Money?’ BMJ 2012;344:e4348 doi: 10.1136/bmj.e4348. 
39 An attempt by US shareholders of 13 drug companies, to force boards to provide the ‘rationale and 
criteria used for these price increases’ failed when the Securities and Exchange Commission asserted that 
the shareholder resolutions related to ‘ordinary business matters’ that are not subject to US federal 
securities law. ‘Pharma Companies Block Investor Requests for Greater Transparency on Drug Pricing’ 
May 3 2017 available at http://www.iccr.org/pharma-companies-block-investor-requests-greater-
transparency-drug-pricing. 
40 V Prasad and S Mailankody, ‘Research and Development Spending to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to 
Market and Revenues After Approval’ (2017) JAMA International Medicine 
doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.3601.  
41 JA DiMasi, HG Grabowski and RW Hansen, ‘Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New 
Estimates of R&D Costs’ (2016) Journal of Health Economics 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.01.012. 
42 See R Harris, ‘R&D Costs for Cancer Drugs Are Likely Much Less than Industry Claims, Study Finds’ 
on NPR.org (Sept 11 2017). 
43 ‘New Research Aims to Unlock Power of Big Data and Open Innovation for Medicine’, University of 
Oxford, available at  
http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/news/201702_New_research. 
44 H McKinnell, A Call to Action: Taking Back Healthcare for Future Generations (McGraw Hill, 2005), as 
quoted by James Love, ‘Perspectives on Cancer Drug Development Costs in JAMA’ in Bill of Health 
Harvard Law Petrie-Flom Center, September 13 2017. 
45 See James Love, ‘Perspectives on Cancer Drug Development Costs in JAMA’ ibid  
46 United Nations Secretary General High Level Panel on Access to Medicines Report (2016) Available at 
<http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/>. 
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There appears to be some international support for cautious measures aimed at 
progressive delinkage to transition away from the current system of monopoly-
linked high prices47 but there is also considerable resistance to overcome, with US 
government initiatives suggesting that delinkage is dangerous to economic 
growth.48 
 In this context it is also worth noting that the most significant way in which 
human rights thinking or human rights law has made inroads into patent law, is 
through evolution of the idea that patent rights are not an unmitigated good but 
one that must be tied to levels of socio-economic development.49 This thinking 
had difficult beginnings during the height of the AIDS controversy, which led 
directly to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha 
amendment).50 The idea that patent laws can, or should be, tempered so as to 
inhibit the adverse impact they have on monopoly pricing or access to protected 
medicines has led to some loosening or questioning of legal standards in domestic 
laws (for instance the compulsory licensing standards in Canada and Thailand,51 or 
the Indian Supreme Court’s observation on prices in Novartis v Union of India).52 
There have been calls for a mechanism over and above the so-called TRIPS 
flexibilities that would subject international trade agreements to review standards 
to protect and advance human rights53. However, many of these interventions 
remain sporadic and anecdotal – partial wins that are not seen as easily replicable 
or enforceable in the law minus political will.54   
 The problem of trying to use human rights to remedy monopoly pricing is 
confounded by a lack of clarity around terminology. The term ‘moral human 
rights’ is used by Alan Buchanan55 to emphasis the strong moral justification for a 
legal human rights regime. It is seen by many as the most appropriate term for the 
prevailing thinking in the human rights movement at large. Yet it also intimates 
                                                      
47 Development of Medicines – Better, Faster, Cheaper, Netherlands Council for Public Health and Society (Nov 
2017) Available at 
<https://www.raadrvs.nl/uploads/docs/Recommendation_Development_of_New_Medicines.pdf> 
Also see in general Delinkage.org. 
48 IP watch <US Working To Block UN High-Level Panel On Access To Medicines Ideas In Geneva 
And Capitals> supra n 28. 
49 UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002) Final Report. The WHO’s strategic statement 
pursues access to medicines as a development goal for all by 2030. 
50 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra n 4.  
51 KM Lybecker, E Fowler, ‘Compulsory Licensing in Canada and Thailand: comparing regimes to ensure 
legitimate use of the WTO rules’ (2009) The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 37, 222–39.  
52 S Thambisetty, ‘Novartis v Union of India and the Person Skilled in the Art: a Missed Opportunity’ (2014) 
Queen Mary Journal of IP 79–94. 
53 Ellen ’t Hoen, speaking at the UN Social Forum, ‘Translating Principles into Action: Access to 
Medicines, Diagnosis, Vaccines and Treatment in the Context of the Right to Health’ convened by the 
Human Rights Council, Oct 4 2017.  Available at <https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/10/10/mechanism-
access-trade-agreements-needed-un-forum-access-medicines-hears/>. 
54 For instance, see the widely-reported US response to India’s decision in Novartis discussed in S 
Thambisetty, n 51; LS Esmail and JC Kohler, ‘The Politics Behind the Implementation of the WTO 
Paragraph 6 Decision in Canada to Increase Global Drug Access’ 2012 Global Health Apr 3, 8:7. 
55 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (OUP, 2013). 
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deep unease and confusion about the basis of human rights in general and of the 
human right to health in particular.56 As John Tasioulas says, ‘so much confusion 
would be avoided if people made clear whether they are talking about human 
rights morality or human rights law’.57 
 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS MORALITY 
 
Broadly speaking there are two approaches to human rights, which go to the very 
heart of the universality and justiciability of these rights. The orthodox view sees 
these rights as moral rights that are possessed by all simply by virtue of being 
human; the political view sees human rights as triggers for intervention or 
benchmarks of political legitimacy. It is also noteworthy that ‘the debate between 
adherents of orthodox and political views has become somewhat less polarised 
over time’,58 for instance, in the discussion of the role of modernity in the 
orthodox view, which often tempers the notion of universal and timeless human 
rights; or in the recognition that even within philosophical discussions the political 
uses of human rights are an important subject of investigation.59 
 While the view that these rights are triggers for intervention, or that they 
specify duties on the part of governments or other entities, is central to the 
development of international human rights law, there are at least two questions of 
relevance for the orthodox view which feed into the human right to health: first, 
are human rights universal; and second, does accepting the universality of moral 
rights presumptively entail a commitment to their enshrinement in law? And 
conversely what does the lack of legal commitment mean for a particular human 
right?  
 Raz, from the political perspective, is keen to highlight that presuming 
universal values raises the bar for any claim that a particular human right exists.60 
The question whether a human right exists or not is the same as whether the 
supposed right exists as one that can be claimed by everyone – and ‘that requires 
showing that some other agent or entity is under a duty to secure the enjoyment of 
the right, at least to some degree and in some way that is plausibly fair and 
reliable’.61 While human rights underpin commitment to the value of human life, 
in reality, this commitment leads to a visceral disconnect. As Susan Marks 
                                                      
56 See James Meyerfield, ‘Human Rights’ Ch 1 in The Promise of Human Rights: Constitutional Government, 
Democratic Legitimacy and International Law (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 235. 
57 Tweet, Feb 27 2017. 
58 John Tasioulas, ‘Exiting the Hall of Mirrors: Morality and Law in Human Rights’, Kings College 
London Law School Research Papers no 2017-19 p 4. 
59 See J Tasioulas, ‘On the Nature of Human Rights’ in S Besson and J Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of 
International Law (OUP, 2010).  
60 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights in the Emerging World Order’ (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 31, 43. 
61 Susan Marks, ‘Four Human Rights Myths’ (2012) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 10 
p. 5. 
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questions, ‘how can we take the presumption of the universality of human rights 
as a given when the most conspicuous fact about the current world order is that 
there exists no such commitment – some lives are endowed with very much more 
value than others’.62  
 The orthodox view also performs a different kind of work in the current 
world order – of presenting a ‘pure’ aspiration that is unsullied by political 
commitments and bargains, and which is peddled as a low-threshold commitment 
that is easy to sign up to and desirable. The non-political creed of human rights 
allows it to be ‘widely understood as a moral alternative to bankrupt political 
utopias’. 63 However, when human rights have to contend with capitalism64 or 
neoliberalism65 – they enter an arena where ‘political visions clash, hard choices 
are made and tainted compromises struck’66 with profound implications for the 
universality of these rights.  
 The curious case of Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR),67 which casts the material and moral rights of authors and 
inventors as a human right, damages the orthodox view further. Intellectual 
property rights generate economic incentives to spur innovation rather than realise 
universal morality; they are alienable, can be held by corporations and can expire 
over time unlike other human rights.68 Both Wendy Gordon69 and Rochelle 
Dreyfuss70 robustly challenge the claim that patent rights are human rights, arguing 
that such an approach has very little expression in national patent laws. They both 
address the question in the context of the apparent paradox that is said to arise 
when one human right is pitted against another.71 In 2015 the UN Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, rather controversially, 
given her remit, ‘flatly denied there is a human right to patent protection’.72  
                                                      
62 Ibid. p. 6. 
63 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Harvard University Press, 2010), 5. Also see Susan Mark’s discussion of 
Naomi Klein in S Marks, ‘Human, Rights and Root Causes’, (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 57. 
64 See discussion of Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (Penguin, 2007), 118 in S Marks, ‘Four Myths’ p. 8. 
65 I prefer Will Davies’ definition of neoliberalism as ‘the state-led remaking of society around the model 
of the market’. Will Davies, ‘Moral Economies of the Future: The Utopian Impulse of Sustainable 
Prosperity’ CUSP Working paper series no 5. Available at <http://www.cusp.ac.uk/pub/wp5/>. 
66 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia (Harvard University Press, 2010), 217. 
67 John Tasioulas, Exiting the Hall of Mirrors, p. 13. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Wendy Gordon, ‘Current Patent Laws Cannot Claim the Backing of Human Rights’ in Willem 
Grosheide (ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (Edward Elgar Ltd, 2010). 
70 Rochelle Dreyfuss, ‘Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox’ New York University School of 
Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Paper No. 06-29 Paper No. 06-29 (2006). 
71 Laurence R Helfer, ‘Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property’ (2007) 40 UC Davis 
Law Review 971–1020.  
72 F Shaheed, Address to the UN Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural 
Rights, 4 Aug 2015. Available here 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16788&LangID=E>. 
Dreyfuss has turned back on her prior position, that Shaheed may have got it wrong with respect to 
material rights. ‘While patent rights are not the only way or even a sufficient way to promote future 
technologies, science is expensive. And because the material interests protected by patents furnish 
significant support to innovations that improve social welfare, an argument can be made that patents do 
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 On the second question, whether universal moral rights reflect and are 
reflected in legalistic human rights, many, including Amartya Sen, have long 
insisted that there is no one-to-one relationship between the universality of human 
rights and the commitment to turn them into law and that there may be all sorts of 
obstacles, both practical and principled, to the converting of a norm into a law.73 
There is much theorising about the converse as well – whether every existing 
human rights law enacted requires a counterpart in human rights morality, such 
that this latter is necessary or sufficient to justify the enactment of the former.74  
 The general consensus seems to be that the law is autonomous in the sense 
that you do not need each legal right to be mirrored by a universal moral right, and 
indeed the existence of a universal moral right is not necessary or even sufficient 
to justify the legal right that it mirrors. This reasoning supposedly strengthens the 
legalistic approach by formalising a distinction between the moral and legal, in 
order to bolster the authority of the legal to trigger interventions. Indeed, many 
human rights lawyers are inclined to ‘bypass the question of whether something 
really is a human right, in the moral sense, by treating the law as dispositive of the 
matter’.75 
 The indeterminacy in the legal form of the human right to health therefore 
suffers directly from two broad trends in critical thinking on human rights: first, 
the ambiguity in the legal form reflects the modern-day moderation of the 
presumption of universality; and second, the autonomy of the legal form distinct 
from the moral version of this right, with a view to strengthening the basis for 
intervention, leaves us with uncertain recourse to the ethical and normative 
underpinnings of this right. The human right to health idiolect is scattered over 
several indeterminate phrases that allow great latitude amongst states in giving 
enforceable shape and form to this human right.76 So in case of contingencies such 
as scarce public resources or the involvement of private corporations, the legalistic 
indeterminacy becomes hostage to imbalances in power. 
 Article 25 of the UDHR speaks of the right of all persons to ‘an adequate 
standard of living including guarantees for health and well-being’. The human right 
to health is set out in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (‘the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
                                                                                                                                         
have human right dimensions. In that case thought must be given to ways to promote the right to share 
in scientific advancement within a globally coordinated patent system. R Dreyfuss, ‘Patents and Human 
Rights: The Paradox Reexamined’ New York School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series Working Paper No: 15–35. 
73 Amartya Sen, ‘Human Rights and the Limits of Law’ (2006) Cardozo Law Review 27: 2913–2927 and 
discussion of Sen in John Tasioulas, ‘Exiting the Hall of Mirrors: Morality and Law in Human Rights’ 
Kings College London Dickson Poon School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series: Paper No. 
2017-19 (2017). 
74 See James Griffin, ‘Human Rights and the Autonomy of International Law’, in S Besson and J 
Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 354–55. 
75 This, in Tasioulas words, is Griffin’s main beef with the autonomous view. See Tasioulas, ‘Exiting the 
Hall of Mirrors’, p 10. 
76 Principally as seen in the UNDHR and the ICESCR. 
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standards of physical and mental health’). Article 2 also sets out the general 
obligations of states in relation to the Covenant rights and includes elliptical 
phrases such as ‘progressive realization’, ‘maximum available resources’ and ‘all 
appropriate means’.77  
 These phrases are used to draw support for a variety of approaches including 
those that demand radical inclusivity in how this right ought to be legally rolled 
out; and those who would include non-legalistic content, such as the current UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights78 (2011). It speaks of three 
principles – protect, respect and remedy, themselves an evolution from the deeply 
divisive debate on the Norms on Transnational Corporations79 which sought to 
impose on companies directly under international law the same range of human 
rights duties that states have accepted for themselves under treaties they have 
ratified to promote and secure human rights. That early effort divided the business 
community and human rights advocacy groups while enjoying little support from 
governments despite the view taken by many international and public global health 
campaigns that corporate responsibility and action are instrumental to achieving 
better standards of health and well-being,80 including access to medicines. 
 
 
THE PLACEHOLDER VIEW OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
What we are left with then, is a generalisable view of human rights law which 
comes closest to explaining the difference between the object of the human right 
to health, which may well be universal, and the legal technique that assigns rights 
to individuals. John Tasioulas refers to this view as the ‘Formative Aim Thesis’ – 
wherein the integrity or coherence of international human rights law, as one part 
of the domain of international law, does not depend on specific universal norms 
that are mirrored in legal forms/rights but on the view that international human 
rights law is primarily concerned with giving effect to universal moral rights, in ‘so 
far as it is appropriate for international law to do so through the technique of 
assigning individual rights to all human beings’.81  
                                                      
77 Art 2 (1) ICESCR. 
78 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human rights (2011). Available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>. 
79 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regards to Human Rights UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) Available at 
<http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/links/norms-Aug2003.html>. 
80 See for instance, Oxfam International, Save the Children and VSO, ‘Beyond Philanthropy: The 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Developing World’ (2002); and Amy 
Kapczynski, ‘Addressing Global Health Inequalities: An Open Licensing Approach for University 
Innovations’ (2005) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 20(2) 1032–1114. 
81 J Tasioulas, (2005) ‘Exiting the Hall of Mirrors’, p. 11. ‘The only kind of ‘mirroring’ that the Formative 
Aim Thesis inherently involves is of a very limited, formal kind: the general form of human rights 
morality – universal (moral) rights possessed by all human beings – will itself be mirrored by the 
distinctive legal technique adopted by IHRL to realise those rights, i.e. universal (legal) rights possessed 
by all human beings. 
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 The Formative Aim Thesis is a reasonable function of the scepticism that 
follows the concession that the battle for an ‘idea of human rights functioning in a 
constitutionally overarching kind of way with genuine global reach, effective and 
enforceable’ was lost by 1945.82 National sovereignty and nation states were to 
become the functional units of enforceable human rights, not human beings. 
International treaties, such as the TRIPS Agreement, which obligate states to set 
up a territorial property right that can be owned by politically endowed 
international corporations often based in nation states outside of the state that 
administers the patent right, is therefore one of the weakest links in the subaltern 
life of human rights. It exposes the collision of the ideal of human rights with 
human rights law. As Conor Gearty says, the first is an ethical aspiration, the 
second a producer of outcomes in real world situations.83 Recasting a goal – 
affordable medicines – as a human rights goal makes obvious philosophical, but 
little legal, sense for those seeking a specific change. Although Tasioulas contends 
that those persuaded by the orthodox view should accept the Formative Aim 
Thesis, clearly and unlike in the orthodox view, this sort of morality with its caveat 
of ‘appropriate’ is instrumental, contingent and pragmatic. It accepts the political 
creed as a given and dwells in the world of compromise, bargain and constraints.84  
 The Formative Aim Thesis has several implications for the effectiveness of 
intervention and advocacy of the international human rights to health.85 where the 
right becomes a placeholder orchestrating political space, even monopolising it.86 
It only condemns particular manifestations of injustice or injury rather than 
providing analytically precise accounts of the forces of injury.87 It is inclined to 
relieve suffering, but not to develop insight into why it occurs.88 As a result, 
instances of the purported abuse of human rights – for instance, the price tag of 
$89,000 a year for Emflaza,89 the new muscular dystrophy drug, or the fact that 
life-saving drug Humira is protected by over 100 patents, are seen as unfortunate 
delinquencies rather than the predictable result of a financial and regulatory system 
that grants and embellishes market monopolies.  
 The placeholder view is palpable in the evolution of the so-called TRIPS 
flexibilities. Legal commentators have long observed that the ambiguous language 
in the TRIPS Agreement allows for creative interpretation that can moderate the 
                                                      
82 C Gearty, ‘The State of Human Rights’ (2014) Global Policy 5:4 391–400 at 393. 
83 Ibid. 396. 
84 This is not to say that international human rights law has always maintained the integrity of its 
formative aim. If it had, according to Tasioulas, it would allow it to be more responsive to claims of the 
proliferation of norms, ‘Hall of Mirrors’, p. 11. 
85 For a discussion on human rights myths that fuel advocacy, see Susan Marks, ‘Four Myths’, supra n 62. 
86 Wendy Brown, ‘The Most We Can Hope For ...”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism’ (2004) 
103 South Atlantic Quarterly 451, 453. 
87 Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 37. 
88 S Marks, ‘Four Myths’, p. 11. 
89 Currently set at $35,000 after a backlash. Available at <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ptc-
therapeutics-dmd-drug-emflaza-to-cost-35000-a-year-and-launch-within-the-coming-week-2017-05-08>. 
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grant and impact of patents.90 For instance, the Declaration on Regulatory 
Sovereignty91 argues that such interpretations must be treated as necessary 
‘differentiation’ rather than discriminatory of technologies, which would be ultra 
vires the Treaty. However, the focus on for instance, the interpretation of ‘public 
health needs’ or ‘local working’ while granting compulsory licences92 to produce 
patented medical products forces a response to particular architectures of specific 
harm rather than drawing attention to the imbalances in the way we fund 
innovation in medicinal products in the first place. Even these responses are 
severely contested and their legitimacy doubted.93 As Ellen ’t Hoen notes: ‘If we 
continue to rely on a system of exclusivities to finance innovation you will always 
have high drug pricing, rationing of essential medicines and growing inequalities 
and inequities in health …’. While TRIPS flexibilities may moderate the 
consequences, it does not offer a solution to the deeper problem. 
 It is this ineffectual placeholder view of the human right to health that is 
rather paradoxically reflected in the UN Rapporteur’s statement that when in 
conflict, human rights must prevail over patent rights.94 The word ‘prevail’ here 
could refer to superior legal character or superior moral authority. The first is 
palpably false, given that internationally intellectual property rights are tied to 
international trade, a relatively hard-edged dispute settlement authority and the 
possibility of trade-related sanctions. In terms of moral authority then, Shaheed 
must be implicitly referring to the generalisable moral view or a version of the 
Formative Aim Thesis. However both as a descriptive and normative proposition, 
her statement is utopic as it ignores the historic and incremental strengthening of 
patent rights, fuelled by disparities in economic power amongst nation states, 
focusing instead on those specific instances of ‘where patent rights and human 
rights are in conflict’. In this sense, Shaheed’s statement constricts our ambition to 
gain any credible, real relief from the systemic imbalances of trade-related 
intellectual property rights, and the inflationary pressures these rights face directed 
by global capital. It also severely underestimates the technocratic disposition of 
patent law and it is to this I now turn.  
 
                                                      
90 ‘Most importantly, TRIPS does not define key terms. For medicines, the absence of definitions for new 
and inventive step provides a great deal of leeway’. Dreyfuss and Rodriguez-Garavito, p. 13. A recent 
WHO paper tasks rich countries with creating robust and workable legislative frameworks to facilitate the 
delivery of essential medicines to their poorer neighbours within TRIPS flexibilities. D Nicol and O 
Owoeye, ‘Using TRIPS Flexibilities to Facilitate Access to Essential Medicines (2013) Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 91:533-539. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.12.115865 (18 April 2013). 
91 Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS. Available at 
<https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf>. 
92 JH Reichman, ‘Comment: compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceutical inventions: evaluating 
the options’ (2009) J Law Med Ethics 37: 247–63 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-
720X.2009.00369.x pmid: 19493070. 
93 KM Lybecker, E Fowler, ‘Compulsory licensing in Canada and Thailand: comparing regimes to 
ensure legitimate use of the WTO rules’ (2009) The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 37: 222–
39 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2009.00367.x pmid: 19493068. 
94 F Shaheed, supra n 71. 
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THE TECHNOCRATIC PATENT SYSTEM AND THE DIFFICULTY 
IN ACCOMODATING HUMAN RIGHTS THINKING 
 
In this section I detail the many different ways in which reflexive spaces are non-
existent or shrinking in a technocratically disposed patent system. The framework 
of most patent legislations, whether national or international, allow for regulatory 
and interpretative ambiguity. Even higher appellate court decisions carry a level of 
incomplete decision-making. Reacting to the recent US Supreme Court (‘SC’) 
decision of Alice, for instance, Robert Merges says the SC’s resolution of the 
question ‘is software patentable?’ was akin to the answer 42 in the Hitchhiker’s 
Guide. The SC said if ‘the claimed invention involves a prohibited category then 
under the second prong of the test, analysis shifts to whether the inventor has 
added "something more" which might constitute an "inventive concept" beyond 
an abstract idea, law of nature or (presumably) a product of nature’.95 The decision 
did not give further content to this idea of 'something more' – a task that is left to 
the USPTO.96 
 While deliberating Human Genome Sciences v Eli Lilly and Co,97 it was suggested 
to the UKSC that the UK might adopt the ‘utility’ standard for industrial 
application – transplanted from US law. The court acknowledged the rapid 
evolution of new norms in US jurisprudence but said, rightly, ‘however, there are 
obvious risks in relying on US jurisprudence when considering the precise nature 
of the requirements of Article 57’.98 The court then went on to confirm multiple 
terms that echo the utility standard in the US by adopting 15 principles from the 
EPO Technical Board of Appeal decisions. Not remarkable in itself, but 
astonishing when you consider that the EPO has been using these terms derived 
from US law from about 2002 onwards. The UKSC did not ask questions about 
the provenance of the terms in the EPO’s usage, satisfying itself only that they do 
in fact emerge from EPO decisions. Nor is there an exploration of the basis of the 
15 principles that speak to one of the three most important patentability criteria. 
 This level of generality and incomplete theorising is not unusual for patent 
decisions, but has led directly to an extraordinary increase in the power of patent 
offices like the USPTO and the EPO. In many jurisdictions, they actualise legal 
decisions by courts, and fill interpretational gaps in legislation further tweaked in 
the course of granting or rejecting individual applications. Patent Office decisions 
are made mostly on the basis of documents, through office actions on the basis of 
limited information within the framework of the specialist legislation being 
                                                      
95 Rob Merges, “Go ask Alice — what can you patent after Alice v. CLS Bank?” (20 June 2014), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-
bank/. 
96 See discussion in S Thambisetty ‘Alice and Something More: The Drift Towards European Patent 
Jurisprudence’ 2016 J of Law and Biosciences 691–696. 
97 [2011] UKSC 51. 
98 Ibid. [40]. 
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administered. This decision-making rationality does not lend itself easily, if at all, 
to intervention on grounds of public utility, ethics or human rights. 
 A conventional view of patent law tells us that the grant of a patent is a quid 
pro quo – a bargain in return for the social utility of and information about a new, 
inventive and industrially applicable invention.99 Patentability criteria are 
predicated on the legal tests being able to fathom adequacy of social utility. In 
reality it is almost impossible to measure or speculate on the merits of the social 
bargain with functional accuracy for individual patent applications during the 
examination process.100 
 At the time of the grant of a patent, very little is known about the technical or 
commercial prognosis or other consequences of grant. Patentability criteria, such 
as inventive step or industrial application, are simply not designed to include 
complex analysis of the commercial or social impact of a grant of individual 
patents, as these are likely to unfold further down the line, influenced by non-
linear technical realities.101 As such, the discovery of an invention and its 
transformation into innovation are economically and sociologically ‘entirely 
different things’.102 
 Patent examiners are not equipped to collect data that might help inform 
decisions on social utility or commercial viability and patent applicants have no 
obligation or incentive to provide such information in individual cases. Stating that 
any given patent is justified because of the social utility imparted by the invention 
is therefore based on faith in the overall incentive structure103 rather than an 
individualised evaluation at the time of the grant of a particular patent. The social 
utility of individual patents, and evaluation of the quid pro quo of the monopoly 
versus social benefit in any individual case, requires a radical retooling of patent 
law; to talk of one without the other, as substantive justifications of 
pharmaceuticals do, is duplicitous. 
 Therefore the single greatest challenge to the incorporation of ‘human rights 
thinking’ in domestic patent law is the way in which the grant of patents is 
separated from the consequences of the exploitation of patents, which is where 
there is most scope for the impairment of human rights.104 Because those who 
                                                      
99 BN Roin “The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or Lack Thereof).” Harvard Law Review, vol. 
118, no. 6, 2005, pp. 2007–2028.  
100 Schumpeter. Scherer, FM Innovation and growth: Schumpeterian perspectives (MIT Press, 1984).  
101 S Thambisetty, ‘Patents as Credence Goods’ (2007) OJLS Issue 4, 707–740.  
102 JA Schumpeter, Business Cycles – A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process 
(McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939) 85. 
103 In fact, there are plenty of econometric studies that suggest that the impact of private knowledge 
strategies on public knowledge production may in fact be negative. K G Huang and F Murray, ‘Does 
Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics’ 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 52, No. 6, pp. 1193-1221, 2009. 
104 The EPO functioning under the European Patent Convention deals with grant of patents but not with 
infringement or post-grant exploitation of the patents, which is left to national courts or national and 
inter-state competition law authorities. See S Thambisetty, ‘Patent Litigation in the United Kingdom: 
Solutions in Search of a Problem?’ 2010 EIPR, 32, 238–246. 
 
 
Siva Thambisetty    Improving Access to Patented Medicines: Are Human Rights Getting in the Way? 
 
 
 19 
discuss the norms for grant or denial of patents do not and cannot directly analyse 
the outcomes of such grants;105 because there is very little appetite amongst such 
bodies to take account of projected impacts sometime in the future;106 and because 
the faith in the incentive effect of patents is so strong107 (demonstrated in part by 
the fact that there is little or no leverage on patent holders post incentive), there is 
very little reflexive space for consideration of human rights in the patent system. 
 There are two major contexts in which human rights thinking in the sense of 
a generalisable political morality discussed above may infuse patent law. Broadly, 
these are: first, during the application of these norms through different degrees of 
granularity, such as domestic legislation and administrative processes like patent 
examination guidelines both domestic or under inter-state treaties (such as the 
European Patent Convention). Many legislative provisions in patent law are 
ambiguous and open to industry- or technology-specific contexts.108 Second, 
during the creation of norms, a substantive process that happens rarely and 
requires some form of international agreement. 
 
(1) APPLICATION OF NORMS 
 
It is the resources and disposition of the agencies tasked with application and 
enforcement that determine the balance the regulatory regime has struck.109 By 
and large for developing countries with relatively recently established patent 
systems, it is true that international rules percolate down to local bodies involved 
in implementation and application. Within and out of entities like the European 
Patent Office (EPO) or the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), we also 
see an upward mobility of norms from local, technocratic entities that are not 
subject to conventional policy oversight but carry agenda-setting power to 
international fora.110 The technical cooperation between networked patent offices 
(such as the Trilateral Office – a grouping of JPO, USPTO and EPO)111 that 
                                                      
105 This is also reflected in the difficulty in valuing patents accurately. See MA Lemley and C Shapiro, 
‘Probabilistic Patents’ 2005 Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(2) 75–98. 
106 While competition law has a sophisticated set of tools to analyse the consequences of actions on 
markets, patent law tends to assume the right outcomes flow from the incentive structure at the point of 
grant of property rights over information. For a discussion on the values that undergird IP, see Susan 
Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
107 See EE Johnson, ‘Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy’ (2012) 39 Florida State University Law 
Review, 623–80. 
108 Burk and Lemley, ‘Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?’ (2002) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 17(4) 
1155–206. 
109 See discussion in RC Dreyfuss and C Rodriguez-Garavito, ‘Conclusion: Balancing Wealth and Health 
in a Transnational Regulatory Framework’ pp. 323–343 in R Dreyfuss and C Rodriguez-Garavito (eds), 
Balancing Wealth and Health: The Battle Over Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines in Latin America (Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
110 L Davies, ‘Technical Cooperation and the International Coordination of Patentability of 
Biotechnological Inventions’ 2002 (29) Journal of Law and Society 137–162.  
111 Ibid. Also see S Thambisetty, ‘Learning Needs’ (2014) IPQ. 
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gradually builds support for coordinated positions, driven by a model of patent 
law that is indifferent to outcomes, exacerbates the problem of global inaccess. 
 Ambiguous terms in patent legislation, including in the European Patent 
Convention (EPC), when combined with the expertise of the patent office, gives 
rise to choice. Linguistic devices that enable such choice can give rise to an 
appearance of knowledge.112 Patent Examination Guidelines at the EPO for 
instance are not law per se, and so are not subject to oversight and do not bind the 
boards of appeal, yet they set up legitimate expectations amongst patent applicants 
because they are binding on patent examiners. The technical expertise113 and 
administrative attributes of the patent office give these legal positions particular 
form – artefacts of highly technical language that blackbox legal facts – such that 
dissenting from them requires a great deal of unpacking by an entity inside the 
expertise barrier.114 The guidelines are presented as ahistorical, relying on technical 
referents that appeal to allied authorities but ignore contrary legal positions. Over 
time, it results in the mainstreaming of remarkable legal positions barely supported 
by the conventional language in patent statutes.  
 For instance, it is now accepted that a ‘computer implemented method claim 
is not a claim in the category of computer programs’115 even though that method 
is put in place using a computer program. This is only the latest in a variety of 
cognitive gymnastics that give substance to different computer implemented 
inventions as a claim category. A recent report by the EPO on patents of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution identifies ‘data exchange’ as the most significant 
defining characteristic of the underlying technologies.116 The range of inventions 
reported on must put to rest any notion of the continued unpatentability of 
computer programs, or as they are referred to, ‘computer implemented 
inventions’. In another example the EPO Guidelines define excluded ‘diagnostic 
methods’ as a series of multiple phases – all of these phases have to be present in 
the claim and each of them has to be ‘practised in or on the human or animal 
body’ for the exclusion to kick in; if even one of the phases could be described as 
‘technical’ it will fall outside the exclusion and make the diagnostic method 
patentable. The result is an elaborately constructed claim category that provides 
several loopholes to the exclusionary clause, so much so that the only diagnostic 
claim that is unpatentable is one that is badly drafted.117  
 The transformation of the Swiss-use claim, for medical substances from 
‘rhetorical oddity to substantive law’ is one such textual artefact that has had 
severe consequences for the access to medicines, and exacerbates the problem of 
                                                      
112 S Thambisetty, ‘Construction of Legitimacy in European Patent Law’ (2017) IPQ  221–44. 
113 L Davies, supra n 107.  
114 S Parthasarathy, ‘Breaking the Expertise Barrier: Understanding Activist Strategies in Science and 
Technology Policy Domains’ 2010 Science and Policy 37(5) 355–367. 
115 G 3/08 [2011] OJ EPO 10 at [11.2.7]. 
116 EPO 2017, Report ‘Patents and the Fourth Industrial Revolution’. 
117 S Thambisetty, IPQ (2017) 231–33. 
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monopoly pricing.118 Swiss-use claims in the form of a manufacturing claim were 
designed to circumvent a provision that said that methods of medical treatment 
are not patentable because they are not industrially applicable. The Swiss-use claim 
is a representation of second or subsequent medical uses of a known substance, 
which is a use that is in effect a method of treating the new condition or disease.  
 The claim type allows for such uses to be patentable as a method of 
manufacture of a medicament; since this is explicitly an industrial application, the 
claim in that form escapes the method of medical treatment exclusion. The claim 
itself does not disclose any new method of manufacture of a medicament – it is 
merely a somewhat absurd device that makes hitherto unpatentable subject matter 
patentable. Swiss-use claims ‘derive novelty by analogy from the new therapeutic 
use rather than the process of manufacturing the medicament’ even though the 
claim is specifically written as a manufacturing claim to escape the exclusionary 
effect of another provision.119 
 These claims are at the heart of what is euphemistically called pharmaceutical 
lifecycle management where certain claim types can lay the foundation of new 
patents on incremental innovations surrounding the original patent – such as use 
of the same substance for new diseases, new patient group, new dosage and even 
new information about how the pharmaceutical works. The recent Pregabalin 
litigation in the UK on the implications of accepting Swiss-use claims for a 
prominent prescription medication brings to fore the shrinking ability to make 
root and branch evaluations in court, and exposes how over time contrivances like 
the Swiss-use claim accrue into axiomatic positions that are hard to deviate 
from.120  
 To bring a human rights perspective to bear in the application of patent 
norms requires an understanding and willingness to enquire about the outcomes 
of the application of particular versions of the law. Generally patent offices are the 
only supplier of norms in a complex system of rules and regulations.121 This 
dominant position, shored up by an expertise barrier122 and technocratic 
reasoning,123 functions as an epistemic firewall, militating against consequential 
                                                      
118 S Thambisetty, IPQ (2017) ibid. 236–37; and could also become a problem in the case of personalised 
medicine. 
119 Ibid. 236–37. 
120 Warner-Lambert Company LLC v Generics (UK) Ltd (t/a Mylan) & Ors [2016] EWCA Civ 1006, see W 
Kaplan, ‘Repurposing Medicines: A Case for Low and Middle Income Countries’ at 383494 (394–395) in 
Z Babbar (ed.), Pharmaceutical Policy in Countries with Developing Healthcare Systems (Springer International, 
2017). 
121 C Long, ‘PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law’ (2009) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1965. 
122 S Parthasarathy, ‘Breaking the Expertise Barrier: Understanding Activist Challenges to Science and 
Technology Policy Domains’ (2010) 37 Science & Public Policy 355. Also see Arthur Daemmrich, 
‘Epistemic Contests and Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization: The Brazil – USA Cotton Dispute 
and Incremental Balancing of Global Interests’ (2012) 4(1) Trade Law & Development 200 discussing 
questions of expertise, and methods for bounding disputes over scientific facts at the WTO.  
123 See M Shapiro, ‘“Deliberative, Independent” Technocracy v Democratic Politics: Will the Globe Echo 
the EU?’ 2004 Law and Contemporary Problems 68, 341–56. 
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reasoning that is not explicitly called for in the statute. As Dreyfuss and 
Rodriguez-Garavito note:  
 
[D]isputes over intellectual property and access to medicines can require 
specialized knowledge about chemical components and products, cost-benefit 
analysis, financial risk assessment, and the economics of generic competition. 
The values that traditionally undergird information law can easily be lost in 
the analysis.124 
 
The UN has called for action in multilateral organisations like the WHO, WIPO 
and WTO to strengthen the capacity of patent examiners at both national and 
regional levels to apply rigorous ‘public health-sensitive standards of 
patentability’125 taking into account public health needs. This particular 
recommendation has received very little reinforcement. It is translated for instance 
in a EU parliamentary resolution as ‘strict application of patentability criteria’. 
Without spelling out what the strict application of criteria would look like, or how 
it differs from lax applications of the criteria – this is a toothless missive. It also 
presupposes that patentability criteria itself effectuate the social quid pro quo of 
patents, of which public health needs are one component. 
 There is also a significant resource dimension (cognitive, physical and 
political) that can prevent the construction of ‘other’ desirable values (such as 
human rights thinking). To give an example, India’s S 3(d) has been vaunted as the 
exercise of TRIPS flexibilities led by public health needs. Amy Kapczynski states 
that it could ‘sharp[ly] reduce exclusivity in the domain of medicines’, citing 
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which set forth the ‘objectives’ and 
‘principles’ of the TRIPS Agreement and lend support to India’s interpretation of 
it. It does so by denying patents to new forms of known pharmaceuticals, which 
prevents an extended monopoly on an already patented pharmaceutical.126 Rather 
surprisingly, however, Shadlen and Sampat,127 conducting the first systematic 
study of patents on secondary inventions in India, Brazil and Argentina, found 
that measures designed to inhibit secondary inventions are having little effect. 
There could be a number of reasons for this, including the competence of patent 
examiners and their learning needs,128 as well as the presence of technical or 
legitimacy networks that may be working to undermine the real effect of the 
provisions.  
                                                      
124 supra n 113 p. 13.  
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 As anthropologist Alexei Yurchak argues129 in the context of the paradoxes of 
life in the Soviet Union before it collapsed, everyone knew the system was failing 
but no one could imagine any alternative to the status quo, and most people were 
resigned to keeping up the pretence of a functioning society. Over time the 
delusions become self-fulfilling and the pretence is accepted by everyone as real, 
an effect that Yurchak termed hypernormalisation. In many respects patent law’s 
technocratic leaning has led to a widespread view that we cannot go on as we are, 
yet it seems impossible to imagine an alternative to the status quo.130 Human 
rights thinking should no longer prop up the pretence of a well-functioning patent 
system. 
 
(2) CREATION OF PATENT RULES AND NORMS 
 
The WTO and WIPO are the two most significant institutions where norm-setting 
takes place but they are both subject to processes with variable margins for human 
rights thinking. Any norms set in these start out as ‘soft law’ but in the words of 
Cornish, as quoted by Rochelle Dreyfuss,131 they have ‘Genevan bootstraps’ which 
harden over time through incorporation in bilateral agreements, citation in 
Dispute Settlement Board reports and adoption by the WTO ministerial 
conference.132 While the WTO provides a forum on discussion about compliance, 
the Dispute Settlement Board resolves issues of interpretation and enforcement of 
the TRIPS Agreement. 
 One of the easily recognised ‘harbinger[s] of more broad-based efforts to 
revise, reinterpret, or supplement intellectual property protection standards 
adopted in the WTO and WIPO’133 is the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, which affirms the principle of balanced intellectual property 
protection134 already embedded in various clauses of TRIPS. The promised formal 
hierarchisation of rules that define the relationship between trade law and human 
rights law following the Doha Declaration, however, never materialised. 
According to Andrew Lang, this was never politically or practically feasible and the 
WTO has little appetite to over-extend its own legitimacy in this way.135 The swell 
                                                      
129 Alexie Yurchak, Everything was Forever Until it was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton 
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of international political will that responded to developing countries unable to 
afford the patented pharmaceuticals needed to prevent hundreds of thousands 
dying of HIV/AIDS may mean that the success of the Doha Declaration is a one-
off, a rejoinder to a sequence of events in the wake of the end of apartheid, and 
difficult to replicate.  
 WIPO norm-setting is often long drawn-out, bulked out with rhetoric, 
posturing and non-legalistic elements. Through its working groups and standing 
committees, it monitors developments and issues reports on a variety of technical 
matters. Discussions are often driven by developing countries.136 In the case of 
traditional knowledge137 the issue has languished138 at the WIPO since the first 
fact-finding effort carried out in 1998–99.139 The need for informed consent for 
patenting outcomes of biological prospecting from human subjects, perhaps one 
of the most significant issues that has a direct impact on human dignity and 
autonomy, was also discussed for several years at the WIPO before being 
rejected.140 While WIPO cannot directly intervene in the TRIPS mechanism, it is 
also true that WIPO’s ‘technical assistance’ in the form of model patent laws or 
training programmes for officials has shaped domestic understandings of patent 
norms profoundly.141 Yet until recently ‘WIPO was conspicuously absent from 
global public policy debates about public health and as some may argue, it was 
curious if at all only for reasons of institutional self-interest’.142 
 The dominance of trade-related intellectual property agreements and legal 
standards has led to an explosion in intellectual property law-making in multiple 
lateral fora,143 reflecting the issue density and complex policy interfaces where 
                                                      
136 See WIPO, ‘Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property’ Background Brief (2015) Available at 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_tk_1.pdf>. 
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141 See Ruth L Okediji, ‘The Role of WIPO in Access to Medicines’ in Dreyfuss and Robrigues-Garavito 
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intellectual property issues become relevant, including human rights. Helfer 
explains how actions in these fora lay the political groundwork needed to integrate 
new principles, norms and rules of intellectual property protection into the WIPO 
and other agencies. From there they gather political strength and can apply to re-
enter the trade-related regime. However, the strategic fortunes of this sort of 
regime shifting is uncertain and amorphous. Much of the work done in a human 
rights context, for instance, remains soft law that cannot excuse non-compliance 
with the TRIPS Agreement; and WTO jurists are unwilling to give interpretive 
weight to soft law in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement while also being resistant 
to deciding when soft law may become a binding norm.144 Simplistically, one set of 
rules to do with patent rights related to international trade are for the most part 
legally entrenched and backed by global rules that can be enforced in a dispute 
settlement process, while the other, ‘human rights thinking’, suffers from all the 
infelicities of political moralism. Recent concerted efforts that recast the access to 
medicines as a global problem, not just one that is suffered by low- or middle-
income countries, may give further credence to regime-shifting strategies where 
political will in one forum is used to incubate legal positions that then become 
more mobile.  
 A noteworthy development in a global context is the Marrakesh Treaty, 
which behoves parties to address the rights of those who are visually impaired 
through the instrument of copyright law.145 Although the preamble refers to 
human rights instruments,146 the negotiations were framed by tightly interpreted 
copyright exceptions – a normative architecture that is inherently limiting.147 
WIPO’s perspective, that it is national intellectual property offices that must 
implement the Treaty and not human rights authorities,148 also suggests that the 
                                                                                                                                         
of the Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines’ in T C Halliday and G Shaffer (eds), 
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Treaty dons the mantle of being at the intersection of IP and human rights in a 
rather post-hoc way.149  
 Increasingly EU institutions also function as sites of norm creation – with 
Brusselian bootstraps. In recent times, the most credible opportunity for the 
creation of norms has arisen from the UNSGHLP report recommending 
‘delinkage’ as a way of dissociating investment in R and D from drug prices.150 It is 
a broad norm with real potential to shine a light on some of the systemic 
inequalities that support dubious claims on the cost of drugs.151 
 The European Parliament adopted the text of a resolution on Access to 
Medicines,152 which restricts delinkage to antimicrobial drugs and ‘poverty-related’ 
diseases. This language narrows the problem of monopoly pricing to specific 
instantiations that cordon themselves off from an enquiry into the ills of 
monopoly drug pricing and inflated claims made by pharmaceutical corporations. 
The reference to ‘poverty-related’ diseases in particular discards the human rights 
element to the low-income country context. But the consequences of reduced 
resources and stripped-back public health services mean that systemic inaccess due 
to rising prices of drugs is a global problem.153   
 The application of norms can also include technical workarounds that cater to 
human rights without breaking the law. For instance, reverse engineering is 
accepted practice with a long history. ‘Lawyers and economists have endorsed 
reverse engineering as an appropriate way for firms to obtain information’ about 
another firm’s product even if it is in direct competition.154 Attempts to thwart 
reverse engineering through contracts or through technical obfuscation can be 
resisted through policy changes which would in effect have a human rights impact 
by making medicinal products available where there are no patents, and where 
they reduce the time taken to enter the market. There are other domestic inroads 
made by human rights thinking on patent law, although not always presented as 
such. Brazil’s ANVISA agency is tasked with approval of pharmaceutical patent 
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applications where public health is a concern. This is a tool to prevent grant of 
problematic patents anticipating aggressive exploitation, and it has its detractors.155  
 The use of compulsory licences in Thailand as a strategy to close the access 
gap has also been widely reported on.156 In India, the Novartis decision refers 
extensively to the public interest in rejecting certain kinds of pharmaceutical 
patents, even citing the informal role that the Indian pharmaceutical generic 
industry has played as ‘pharmacy of the Third World’ to support an eligibility rule 
that is at least implicitly designed to prevent trivial, incremental innovation over 
individual pharmaceuticals. Recently the Indian National Human Rights 
Commission queried the anti-compulsory licensing stance purportedly given by 
the Indian Government in the form of ‘private reassurances’ to the India–US 
Business Council.157 There are other interesting cases in domestic law such as the 
celebrated South African constitutional case of Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign, which is seen as successful socio-economic rights litigation because it 
resulted in a direct order to the government to implement a comprehensive 
programme to prevent mother-to-child-transmission of HIV.158 The anecdotal 
nature of these successes, however, is out of kilter with the intensity of resources 
that have historically been put into the progressive project of trying to link human 
rights to patent law and intellectual property.  
 As Helfer details, a lot of time and effort have been spent trying to develop 
norms in lateral regimes that interface with intellectual property law, including 
human rights, in an effort to modify or soften the effect of binding legal norms. 
But this ‘integrationist regime shifting strategy’ has encountered resistance from 
industrialised countries. Efforts poured into such regime shifting take important 
resources away from developing insights into how we can fix the patent system 
and make its ecosystem more amenable to consequential and purposive thinking. 
Intellectual property norm-setting, as Margret Chon argued, is blighted by 
asymmetric power and inequality amongst nation states159 even as health has 
become a legitimate foreign policy concern.160 It is also, as Lang establishes, 
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subject to a great deal of ambiguity because the content and aim of trade regimes 
and human rights are internally intensely contested. The meagre gains made so far 
demonstrate that the path from the Formative Aim Thesis of international human 
rights law to intellectual property norms is uncertain and largely ineffective. Far 
from the progressive ideal, the human right to health is offered up as a sufficing 
placeholder in its interactions with patent law.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The idea that where patent rights and human rights are in conflict, human rights 
must prevail can lead to considerable harm. This view is more conceptually 
cluttered than it appears and locates the entire weight of the promissory project of 
human rights in an implicit hierarchisation of two formal systems of law. Asking 
for patent rights to give way to human rights is not just ineffective: it orchestrates 
intervention, and dampens the possibility of any deep change being effected. The 
indeterminacy of the human right to health and the contingent political moralism 
that gives it shape and form is no match for an unyielding and technocratic patent 
law backed by resistance to integrationist regime shifting from developed 
countries. The promise of human rights gives way to a far more limited 
placeholder function. 
 Patent law’s epistemic firewall also means that it is very difficult for 
‘outsiders’ such as human rights advocates to make a difference, because they do 
not work with the same toolkit and do not bring predictable forms of ultimatum 
with them. As a result, the human right to health has a disappointing impact on 
campaigns that call for the negation or moderation of patent rights. Instead, to 
uncouple human rights from patent law is to take patent law on its own terms and 
seek normative coherence and doctrinal fidelity informed by consequential 
reasoning.  
 Over the last three decades we have seen conventional rationales for the grant 
of patents severely tested by unprecedented subject matter such as living biological 
material and new methods of data exchange, and by the immateriality of software. 
We are heading into the Fourth Industrial Revolution impeded by a patent system 
burdened by centuries of incremental, sector-specific changes. Many academic and 
activist commentators reach out for human rights when it comes to access to 
medicines because of the same sense of unfairness that blights many other aspects 
of patent law. Monopoly-driven pricing, justified by spurious claims, is embedded 
in the dominant justifications for patents that exert no control over how a patent 
is used or exploited. We need new ways to justify and rationalise the grant and 
exploitation of patents that are principled, ethical and entrenched in the gains 
made by international law. These rationalisations must work for all of patent law, 
not just respond to specific technology sectors. The change we really need, then, is 
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not to tinker with patent statutes, but a systemic retooling of patent law, to make it 
reflexive and competent to participate in its own consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
